Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Timothy Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), Tomas Sjostrom and Takehiho Yamato

No 1165, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Keywords: secure implementation; strategy-proofness; pivotal mechanism; Clarke-Groves mechanism; Nash equilibrium; dominant equilibrium; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2003-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? (2006)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2005)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments:Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2003)
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