Secure Implementation Experiments:Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?

Tatsuyoshi Saijo (), Timothy Cason and Tomas Sjostrom

Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept used in social choice theory. Saijo et al. (2003) argue that this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and almost all strategy-proof mechanisms have a continuum of Nash equilibria. For only a subset of strategy-proof mechanisms do the set of Nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide. For example, this double coincidence occurs in the Groves mechanism when preferences are single-peaked. We report experiments using two strategy-proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of Nash equilibria, but the other has a unique Nash equilibrium. We found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C92, D71, D78, and H41.

Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2003-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? (2006)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2005)
Working Paper: Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? (2003)
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