DO U.S. MARKETING ORDERS HAVE MUCH MARKET POWER? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALMOND BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

John Crespi and Adriana Chacon-Cascante

No 19888, 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. The paper analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry on the world market, and the legal authority of the almond marketing order makes it a likely prospect for exhibiting true cartel behavior. The authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California's reserve setting is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel.

Keywords: Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea02:19888

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.19888

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