Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California

John Crespi and Adriana Chacon-Cascante

Agribusiness, 2004, vol. 20, issue 1, 1-15

Abstract: This review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit-maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel. [EconLit citations: L120, L430]. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 20: 1-15, 2004.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: DO U.S. MARKETING ORDERS HAVE MUCH MARKET POWER? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ALMOND BOARD OF CALIFORNIA (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:agribz:v:20:y:2004:i:1:p:1-15

DOI: 10.1002/agr.10081

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