Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

Yann Rébillé and Lionel Richefort

No 206421, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2015-06-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/206421/files/NDL2015-057.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies (2015)
Working Paper: Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:206421

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.206421

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