Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies
Yann Rébillé and
Lionel Richefort ()
No 2015.57, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
Keywords: Bipartite Graph; Public Good; Nash Equilibrium; Non-Linear; Complementarity Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Working Paper: Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies (2015)
Working Paper: Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.57
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