Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies

Yann Rébillé and Lionel Richefort

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.

Keywords: bipartite graph; public good; Nash equilibrium; non-linear complementarity problem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01074708
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Related works:
Working Paper: Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies (2015)
Working Paper: Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies (2015)
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