The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

Alessandro Tavoni (), Maja Schluter and Simon Levin

No 96843, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2010-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96843/files/NDL2010-127.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management (2011)
Working Paper: The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management (2011)
Working Paper: The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:96843

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.96843

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