The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management

Alessandro Tavoni (), Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.

Keywords: cooperation; social norm; ostracism; common pool resource; evolutionary game theory; replicator equation; agent-based simulation; coupled socio-resource dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 Q34 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2011-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37571/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management (2011)
Working Paper: The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management (2010)
Working Paper: The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:37571

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