The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

Alessandro Tavoni (), Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin
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Maja Schlüter: Leibniz-Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries
Simon Levin: Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at Princeton University

No 2010.127, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.

Keywords: Cooperation; Social Norm; Ostracism; Common Pool Resource; Evolutionary Game Theory; Replicator Equation; Agent-based Simulation; Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D70 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management (2011)
Working Paper: The survival of the conformist: social pressure and renewable resource management (2011)
Working Paper: The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.127

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