The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets

Richard Arnott

No 275165, Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the structure of multi-period employment contracts in an economy with identical workers when only incomplete insurance is provided against job-related contingencies. The incompleteness of insurance markets stems from an asymmetry of information between the worker and the insurer. In this situation, the employment contract will provide implicit insurance by paying workers less than their marginal product during some periods and more during others. The paper explores how the characteristics of such contracts are altered by increases in uncertainty, worker risk aversion, hiring costs, and the amount of specific and general training provided. A sequel to this paper examines the efficiency properties of such contracts.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Labor and Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 1980-07
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275165/files/QUEENS-IER-PAPER-395.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets (1982)
Working Paper: The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets (1980)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:queddp:275165

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275165

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