The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets

Richard Arnott

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper examines the structure of multi-period employment contracts in an economy with identical workers when only incomplete insurance is provided against job-related contingencies, stemming from asymmetric information. The employment contract provides implicit insurance by paying workers less than their marginal product during some periods and more during others. The paper explores how contracts are altered by increases in uncertainty, worker risk aversion, hiring costs, and the amount of specific and general training provided.

Pages: 36
Date: 1980
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Journal Article: The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets (1982)
Working Paper: The Structure of Multi-Period Employment Contracts with Incomplete Insurance Markets (1980)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:395

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