The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive

David McEvoy (), Sylvia J. Brandt, Nathalie Lavoie and Sven Anders

No 7389, Working Paper Series from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics

Abstract: In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the implementation of ITQs.

Keywords: Risk; and; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7389/files/wp070003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umamwp:7389

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7389

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().