The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive

David McEvoy (), Sylvia Brandt () and Sven Anders

Land Economics, 2009, vol. 85, issue 3, 470-484

Abstract: In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none has considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. Addressing this question, we find that although fishermen should expect to gain from ITQs under perfect competition, they may suffer welfare losses if the processing sector is imperfectly competitive.

JEL-codes: Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://le.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/85/3/470
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive (2007)
Working Paper: The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:85:y:2009:i:3:p:470-484

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().