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The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive

David McEvoy (), Sylvia Brandt (), Nathalie Lavoie () and Sven Anders ()
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Nathalie Lavoie: Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst

No 2007-3, Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics

Abstract: In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict welfare changes within an open-access fishery transitioning to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. Although related research has explored the effects of market power in the harvesting sector on ITQ performance, none have considered the implications of an imperfectly competitive processing sector. This study addresses this question specifically in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, although its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar industry structure. Our results show that ITQs could have a negative impact on fishermen’s welfare when processors have market power and the cap on aggregate harvest is binding or becomes binding with the implementation of ITQs.

Keywords: ITQ; imperfect competition; welfare analysis; fisheries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 Q22 Q28 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-com and nep-env
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http://courses.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/docum ... rkingPaper2007-3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector Is Imperfectly Competitive (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The Effects of ITQ Management on Fishermen’s Welfare When the Processing Sector is Imperfectly Competitive (2007) Downloads
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