Government turnover in parliamentary democracies

Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo

No 7453, Bulletins from University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center

Abstract: In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7453/files/bu980001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (2000)
Working Paper: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (1998)
Working Paper: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:umedbu:7453

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7453

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bulletins from University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().