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Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies

Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Keywords: government stability; minority coalitions; surplus coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 H19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Government turnover in parliamentary democracies (1998) Downloads
Working Paper: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (1998) Downloads
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