Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies

Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo

No 1232, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) Surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.

Keywords: government stability; minority coalitions; surplus coalitions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 H19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (2000)
Working Paper: Government turnover in parliamentary democracies (1998)
Working Paper: Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies (1998)
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