Equilibrium Agenda Formation

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Le Breton

No 269402, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a de¯nition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The de¯nition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto e±cient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2001-12-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium agenda formation (2004)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269402

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269402

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