EQUILIBRIUM AGENDA FORMATION

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Le Breton
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Michel Le Breton: Universite d'Aix-Marseille

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas for voting by successive elimination and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several other settings.

Keywords: Agenda; Equilibrium; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp628.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium agenda formation (2004)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:628

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