Equilibrium agenda formation

Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Le Breton ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23, issue 1, 57 pages

Abstract: We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known “chaos” theorems. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y

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