Scoring Rule Voting Games and Dominance Solvability

Lucia Buenrostro and Amrita Dhillon ()

No 269592, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide a classification of scoring rule voting games according to whether the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability require sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also characterise the solutions when the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2003-12-12
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Journal Article: Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269592

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269592

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