SCORING RULE VOTING GAMES AND DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY

Lucia Buenrostro and Amrita Dhillon ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda rule and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide a classification of scoring rule voting games according to whether the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability require sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also characterise the solutions when the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied.

Keywords: Scoring Rules; Voting Games; Dominance Solvability; Iterated Weak Dominance; Condorcet Winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability (2013)
Working Paper: Scoring Rule Voting Games and Dominance Solvability (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:698

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