Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
Amrita Dhillon () and
Péter Vida ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 40, issue 2, 329-352
This article studies the dominance solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games when there are three alternatives. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Borda rule, and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of general scoring rule voting games. The sufficient conditions that we provide for dominance solvability are in terms of one statistic of the game: sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also show that the solutions coincide with the set of Condorcet Winners whenever the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied. Approval Voting performs the best in terms of our criteria. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: SCORING RULE VOTING GAMES AND DOMINANCE SOLVABILITY (2004)
Working Paper: Scoring Rule Voting Games and Dominance Solvability (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:329-352
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355
Access Statistics for this article
Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe
More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().