Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited

Ali Ozkes and Remzi Sanver

No 1736, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We revisit the neutrality requirement in social choice theory. We propose a weakening of the standard neutrality condition, by allowing for different procedural treatment for different alternatives while entailing that alternatives enjoy same ex-ante possibility to be chosen. We compare these two conditions theoretically and computationally. Furthermore, we explore social choice problems in which this weakening resolves impossibilities that stem from a fundamental tension between neutrality and anonymity. Finally, we show that in certain social choice problems, this weakening provides an immediate refinement of anonymous, neutral, and Pareto optimal social choice rules towards retaining resoluteness.

Keywords: anonymity; neutrality; Pareto optimality; social choice functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2020)
Working Paper: Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1736

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