Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Ali Ozkes and Remzi Sanver

No 10/2020, Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Abstract: We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness structure these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.

Keywords: anonymity; efficiency; neutrality; resoluteness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2021)
Working Paper: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2021)
Working Paper: Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (2017)
Working Paper: Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (2017)
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