Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited

Ali Ozkes and Remzi Sanver

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We revisit the neutrality requirement in social choice theory. We propose a weakening of the standard neutrality condition, by allowing for different procedural treatment for different alternatives while entailing that alternatives enjoy same ex-ante possibility to be chosen. We compare these two conditions theoretically and computationally. Furthermore, we explore social choice problems in which this weakening resolves impossibilities that stem from a fundamental tension between neutrality and anonymity. Finally, we show that in certain social choice problems, this weakening provides an immediate refinement of anonymous, neutral, and Pareto optimal social choice rules towards retaining resoluteness.

Keywords: anonymity; neutrality; Pareto optimality; social choice functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01613138v1
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Related works:
Working Paper: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited (2020)
Working Paper: Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited (2017)
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