Male Reproductive Health, Fairness and Optimal Policies
Natacha Raffin () and
Thomas Seegmuller ()
No 1816, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France
Based on epidemiological evidence, we consider an economy where agents differ through their ability to procreate. Households with impaired fertility may incur health expenditures to increase their chances of parenthood. This health heterogeneity generates welfare inequalities that deserve to be ruled out. We explore three different criteria of social evaluation in the long-run: the utilitarian approach, which considers the well- being of all households, the ex-ante egalitarian criterion, which considers the expected well-being of the worst-off social group, and the ex-post egalitarian one, which only considers the realized well-being of the worst- off. In an overlapping generations model, we propose a set of economic instruments to decentralize each solution. To correct for the externality and inequalities, both a preventive (a taxation of capital) and a redistributive policy are required.
Keywords: reproductive health; fairness; egalitarianism; optimal policy; OLG model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I31 H23 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-hea
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Working Paper: Male reproductive health, fairness and optimal policies (2018)
Working Paper: Male Reproductive Health, Fairness and Optimal Policies (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1816
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