Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas

Matthew Reimer (), Joshua Abbott () and James Wilen
Additional contact information
Joshua Abbott: School of Sustainability, Arizona State University

No 2013-03, Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics

Abstract: Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) induce changes along the both the extensive margin—via consolidation of quota among fewer vessels—and the intensive margin, as harvesters adjust their behavior to ITQ incentives. We use ITQ introduction in the Bering Sea crab fishery to decompose the sources of rent generation across both margins. We embed an empirically calibrated structural model of the harvesting process into a sector-level model, allowing us to experimentally "unravel" the ITQ treatment. We show that the magnitude and source of rent generation under ITQs critically depends on the manner and degree of rent dissipation before ITQs are implemented.

Keywords: fisheries; ITQ; production function; intensive margin; Alaska; crab (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Forthcoming Land Economics

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201303.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unraveling the Multiple Margins of Rent Generation from Individual Transferable Quotas (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ala:wpaper:2013-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jonathan Alevy ().