In the Shadow of Coase
Rémi Morin Chassé,
John Strandholm () and
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John Strandholm: University of South Carolina Upstate
No 2018-03, Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics
We explore how three parties bargain over a public good created by development on only one party’s property. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is indifferent.
Keywords: public good; bargaining; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ala:wpaper:2018-03
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