On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups
Vjollca Sadiraj (),
Jan Tuinstra () and
Frans van Winden ()
No 05-08, CeNDEF Working Papers from Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
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Working Paper: On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups (2006)
Working Paper: On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:05-08
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