On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Vjollca Sadiraj (),
Jan Tuinstra () and
Frans van Winden ()
No 1698, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Keywords: spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups (2005)
Working Paper: On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1698
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