Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains

Agustín Bonifacio, Jordi Masso and Pablo Neme

No 121, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.

Keywords: : Single-peakedness; Strategy-proofness; Anonymity; Unanimity; Tops-onlyness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/121.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains (2023)
Working Paper: Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:121

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