Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains

Agustín Bonifacio, Jordi Masso and Pablo Neme

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023, vol. 106, issue C

Abstract: We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.

Keywords: Single-peakedness; Strategy-proofness; Anonymity; Unanimity; Tops-onlyness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406823000381
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (2022)
Working Paper: Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000381

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102845

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Mathematical Economics is currently edited by Atsushi (A.) Kajii

More articles in Journal of Mathematical Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().