Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains

Pablo Neme, Agustín Bonifacio and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 1324, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.

Keywords: strategy-proofness; anonymity; single-peakedness; unanimity; tops-onlyness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains (2023)
Working Paper: Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1324

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