Complete Characterization of Functions Satisfying the Conditions of Arrow's Theorem

Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz

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Abstract: Arrow's theorem implies that a social choice function satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle (Unanimity) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are allowed, a dictatorial social choice function is defined as a function for which there exists a single voter whose strict preferences are followed. This definition allows for many different dictatorial functions. In particular, we construct examples of dictatorial functions which do not satisfy Transitivity and IIA. Thus Arrow's theorem, in the case of non-strict preferences, does not provide a complete characterization of all social choice functions satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle, and IIA. The main results of this article provide such a characterization for Arrow's theorem, as well as for follow up results by Wilson. In particular, we strengthen Arrow's and Wilson's result by giving an exact if and only if condition for a function to satisfy Transitivity and IIA (and the Pareto Principle). Additionally, we derive formulas for the number of functions satisfying these conditions.

Date: 2009-10, Revised 2011-04
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39(1):127-140

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Journal Article: Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem (2012)
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