Details about Omer Tamuz
Access statistics for papers by Omer Tamuz.
Last updated 2024-08-31. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pta824
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Working Papers
2023
- The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (26)
2020
- Equitable voting rules
Papers, arXiv.org 
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2018)
- Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (3)
- From Blackwell Dominance in Large Samples to Renyi Divergences and Back Again
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (7)
- Rational Groupthink
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (3)
2019
- Social learning equilibria
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (9)
See also Journal Article Social Learning Equilibria, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2020) View citations (10) (2020)
- Stochastic Dominance Under Independent Noise
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press (2020) View citations (7) (2020)
2018
- Repeated Coordination with Private Learning
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)
2017
- The speed of sequential asymptotic learning
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (3)
See also Journal Article The speed of sequential asymptotic learning, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2018) View citations (13) (2018)
2016
- Graphical potential games
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Graphical potential games, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2016) View citations (4) (2016)
2015
- Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (40)
See also Journal Article Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks, Econometrica, Econometric Society (2015) View citations (42) (2015)
2011
- Complete Characterization of Functions Satisfying the Conditions of Arrow's Theorem
Papers, arXiv.org 
See also Journal Article Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2012) View citations (4) (2012)
Journal Articles
2020
- Social Learning Equilibria
Econometrica, 2020, 88, (3), 1235-1267 View citations (10)
See also Working Paper Social learning equilibria, Papers (2019) View citations (9) (2019)
- Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise
Journal of Political Economy, 2020, 128, (5), 1877 - 1900 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper Stochastic Dominance Under Independent Noise, Papers (2019) View citations (1) (2019)
2018
- The speed of sequential asymptotic learning
Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 173, (C), 383-409 View citations (13)
See also Working Paper The speed of sequential asymptotic learning, Papers (2017) View citations (3) (2017)
2016
- Convergence, unanimity and disagreement in majority dynamics on unimodular graphs and random graphs
Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 2016, 126, (9), 2719-2733 View citations (4)
- Graphical potential games
Journal of Economic Theory, 2016, 163, (C), 889-899 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Graphical potential games, Papers (2016) View citations (5) (2016)
2015
- Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks
Econometrica, 2015, 83, (5), 1755-1794 View citations (42)
See also Working Paper Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks, Papers (2015) View citations (40) (2015)
2014
- Scenery reconstruction on finite abelian groups
Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 2014, 124, (8), 2754-2770 View citations (2)
2012
- Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow’s theorem
Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (1), 127-140 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Complete Characterization of Functions Satisfying the Conditions of Arrow's Theorem, Papers (2011) (2011)
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