Graphical potential games

Yakov Babichenko and Omer Tamuz

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the class of potential games that are also graphical games with respect to a given graph $G$ of connections between the players. We show that, up to strategic equivalence, this class of games can be identified with the set of Markov random fields on $G$. From this characterization, and from the Hammersley-Clifford theorem, it follows that the potentials of such games can be decomposed to local potentials. We use this decomposition to strongly bound the number of strategy changes of a single player along a better response path. This result extends to generalized graphical potential games, which are played on infinite graphs.

Date: 2014-05, Revised 2016-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 163, May 2016, Pages 889-899

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Journal Article: Graphical potential games (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1405.1481

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