Repeated Coordination with Private Learning
Tetsuya Hoshino and
Papers from arXiv.org
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.00051 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1809.00051
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().