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Repeated Coordination with Private Learning

Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, Tetsuya Hoshino and Omer Tamuz

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Abstract: We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate on the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2018-08
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