Equitable voting rules
Omer Tamuz and
Papers from arXiv.org
May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.
Date: 2018-11, Revised 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Equitable Voting Rules (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1811.01227
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