Contests with a Non-Convex Strategy Space
Doron Klunover and
Papers from arXiv.org
We characterize the Nash equilibria of a class of two-player contests with "lumpy" effort. Our main result shows that under quite reasonable conditions, constraints on the players' choice sets heighten competition. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that regulation decreases competition, but appears to be consistent with anecdotal evidence. Examples of this phenomenon include arms control, rules and regulations in sports, and drug wars. We also show that a constraint on available strategies can benefit a player.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2018-09, Revised 2019-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04436 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1809.04436
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().