A note on contests with a constrained choice set of effort
Doron Klunover and
Papers from arXiv.org
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.
Date: 2018-09, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04436 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1809.04436
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().