Long-run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion When Mandates are Not Enforceable: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana
Hyuncheol Bryant Kim () and
Papers from arXiv.org
We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy groups. We find evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-ias
Date: 2018-11, Revised 2019-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1811.09004
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