Long-run Consequences of Health Insurance Promotion When Mandates are Not Enforceable: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana

Patrick Asuming, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim () and Armand Sim

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy groups. We find evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization.

Date: 2018-11, Revised 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.09004 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1811.09004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().