Price competition with uncertain quality and cost
Sander Heinsalu ()
Papers from arXiv.org
Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher costs, regardless of whether costs and qualities are private or public. If better quality firms have lower costs, then good quality is sold cheaper than bad under private costs and qualities, but not under public. However, if higher quality is costlier, then price weakly increases in quality under both informational environments.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2019-03, Revised 2019-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1903.03987
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