Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures

Pierpaolo Battigalli (), Paolo Leonetti and Fabio Maccheroni

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as \textquotedblleft Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting.\textquotedblright

Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.02918 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures (2020)
Working Paper: Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures (2019)
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