On the Price of Satisficing in Network User Equilibria

Mahdi Takalloo and Changhyun Kwon

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Abstract: When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern, the total system travel time can be worse than in the case of the PRUE. We show how bad the worst-case satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern can be, compared to the perfectly rational user equilibrium. We call the ratio between the total system travel times of the two traffic patterns the price of satisficing, for which we provide an analytical bound. We compare the analytical bound with numerical bounds for several transportation networks.

Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre
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