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Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers

Michelle Avataneo and Bertan Turhan

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT). These practical rules invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. Following Kominer's (2020) formulation, we also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity and addition of new contracts in the SSPwCT framework. Our results have implications for resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.

Date: 2020-04, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13265 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers (2020) Downloads
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