How to De-Reserves Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India

Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Orhan Aygun ()

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Abstract: We study joint implementation of reservation and de-reservation policies in India that has been enforcing a comprehensive affirmative action since 1950. The landmark judgement of the Supreme Court of India in 2008 mandated that whenever OBC category (with 27 percent reservation) has unfilled positions they must be reverted to general category applicants in admissions to public schools without specifying how to implement it. We disclose the drawbacks of recently reformed allocation procedure in admissions to technical colleges and offer a solution through de-reservation via choice rules. We propose a novel priority design, Backward Transfers (BT) choice rule, for institutions and the deferred acceptance mechanism under these rules (DA-BT) for centralized clearinghouses. We show that DA-BT corrects the shortcomings of existing mechanisms. By formulating the legal requirements and policy goals in India as formal axioms, we show that the DA-BT mechanism is the unique mechanism for concurrent implementation of reservation and de-reservation policies.

Date: 2021-03, Revised 2022-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India (2023)
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