Framing and Social Information Nudges at Wikipedia

Maximilian Linek and Christian Traxler

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze a series of trials that randomly assigned Wikipedia users in Germany to different web banners soliciting donations. The trials varied framing or content of social information about how many other users are donating. Framing a given number of donors in a negative way increased donation rates. Variations in the communicated social information had no detectable effects. The findings are consistent with the results from a survey experiment. In line with donations being strategic substitutes, the survey documents that the negative framing lowers beliefs about others' donations. Varying the social information, in contrast, is ineffective in changing average beliefs.

Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Framing and social information nudges at Wikipedia (2021)
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