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Game Dynamics Structure Control by Design: an Example from Experimental Economics

Zhijian Wang

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Abstract: Game dynamics structure (e.g., endogenous cycle motion) in human subjects game experiments can be predicted by game dynamics theory. However, whether the structure can be controlled by mechanism design to a desired goal is not known. Here, using the pole assignment approach in modern control theory, we demonstrate how to control the structure in two steps: (1) Illustrate an theoretical workflow on how to design a state-depended feedback controller for desired structure; (2) Evaluate the controller by laboratory human subject game experiments and by agent-based evolutionary dynamics simulation. To our knowledge, this is the first realisation of the control of the human social game dynamics structure in theory and experiment.

Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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