School Choice with Farsighted Students

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.

Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-edu and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2212.07108 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: School Choice with Farsighted Students (2022)
Working Paper: School choice with farsighted students (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2212.07108

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